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MUNICIPAL CORPOIRATIONS-TAXATION-ASSESSM£ENT FOR PAV-
iw.-Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 58 S. W. 934.
(Missouri, November, 1900.)
This suit was instituted for the purpose of enforcing the lien of a
tax bill for paving a certain street in Kansas City. The assessment
was made according to the front foot rule and one of the defences
was that this method of apportioning and charging the cost of the
pavement violates the limitation of the Federal Constitution that no
state shall deprive any person of his property without due process
of law.
The law in Missouri on this point was well settled, but the counsel
for the defence deemed the decision of the Supreme Court of the
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United States in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 (1898), of con-
trolling weight on the other side. In that case land belonging to
Mrs. Baker was condemned for the purpose of opening a street and,
because other of her property fronted on the street when opened she
was assessed on the basis of benefits done to that other parcel of
land. The result of the whole -proceeding was that the village of
Norwood acquired her property for nothing and charged her about
two hundred dollars for having deprived her of it. The decision of
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, was to this effect.
First, that the exaction from the owner of abutting property of
the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special
benefits received by him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking,
under the guise of taxation, of private property for public use
without compensation. Second, that in this case the special assess-
ment upon the abutting property of Mrs. Baker of the entire cost
of opening the street, including not only the full amount paid her
for the strip condemned, but the costs and expenses of the condemna-
tion proceedings, was a taking of her property for public use with-
out compensation, in a word, that, while nominally it was an
exercise of the taxing power, it was nothing less than confiscation,
The court was careful to reiterate the general rule, while Justices
Brewer, Shiras and Gray dissented, holding that the case came
under the general rule.
From this it will be readily seen that Norwood v. Baker could
easily be distinguished on the ground of its peculiar facts, and this
is the basis of Chief Justice Gantt's decision in the present case.
The general rule is well known, yet a few authorities nray not be
amiss. The question of making the rule statutory is discussed by
Judge Dillon in his work on "Municipal Corporations" (4th Ed.,
Vol. 2, § 752). "The courts," he says, "are very generally agreed
that the authority to require the property specially benefited to bear
the expense of local improvements is a branch of the taxing power
or included within it. Whether the expense of making such
improvement shall be paid out of the general treasury or be assessed
upon the abutting property or other property specially benefited,
and, if in the latter mode, whether the assessment shall be upon all
property found to be benefited or alone upon the abutters, accord-
ing to frontage or according to the area of their lots, is, according
to the present weight of authority, considered to be a question of
legislative expediency."
There is nothing in the front-foot rule smacking of arbitrary or
fraudulent conduct. This method of taxation has passed under the
scrutiny of the courts of this country and has received their
approval. Judge Cooley, in his work on "Taxation" (page 644),
says: "Such a measure of apportionment seems at first blush to be
perfectly arbitrary, and likely to operate in some cases with great
injustice, but it cannot be denied that in the case of some improve-
ments frontage is a very reasonable measure of benefits-much
more than value could be-and, perhaps, approaching equality as
nearly as any other estimate of benefits made by the judgment of
NOTES.
men." Judge Elliott, in his book on " Roads and Streets" (page
396), says: "The system which leads to the least mischievous and
unjust consequences is that which takes into account the entire line
of the way improved and apportions the expense according to the
frontage; for it takes into consideration the benefit to each property
owner that accrues from the improvement of the entire line of the
way, and does not impose upon one lot owner an unjust portion of
the burden." Chief Justice Sharswood, speaking for the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Hammett v. City of Philadelphia, 65 Pa.
146 (1870), says: "Perhaps no fairer rule can be adopted than the
proportion of feet front, though there must be some inequalities if
the lots differ in situation and depth." A rule so universally
adopted and sustained can hardly be called arbitrary, or so unjust
as to warrant a court to strike down the discretion of the munici-
pality which adopts it.
The case of iXorwood v. Baker was certainly peculiar on its facts,
but why Mrs. Baker, had she benefited to the extent of more than
her assessment, should have reason to complain, is hard to see. Had
the court gone fully into the question of what benefits she had
received, a different result might have been reached. However,
there is no doubt of the correctness of the decision in the Mi.ssouri
case; the other case was correctly distinguished, as it will have to be
whenever this question arises. The validity of the front-foot rule is
now too firmly settled to be overthrown by such a peculiar decision
as Norwood v. Baker, however equitable that decision may have
been. J. D.
ACCEPTANCE OF DEED-RIGHTS OF CREDITOR-ATTACHIN G
BEFORE ASSENT BY GRANTEE, Knox v. Clark, 62 Pac. Rep. (Col.)
334 (Sept. 10, 1900).-The facts and decision of this case, in so far
as they are of special interest, are as follows: A husband being
indebted to his wife, without her knowledge, executed and acknowl-
edged certain deeds of land to her. The husband then had the deeds
recorded and subsequently gave them to his wife, who until that
time had no knowledge whatever of their existence. But between
the time of recording and of such actual acceptance by the wife,
the property deeded was attached by a creditor of the husband,
and the present issue was as to whether the wife had by this
conveyance secured an absolute title prior to the attachment or
whether she took title subject to the lien of the attaching creditor.
Upon these facts the court held in effect that an absolute title
had not vested in the wife prior to the attachment-either by
virtue of the act of recording alone, or by reason of the record-
ing and the subsequent assent. That the title did not vest by
virtue of the recording because, first, since the wife herself had
no knowledge of the deed at the time of the recording, the
recorder could not have acted as her authorized agent to accept
it; and, second, even if the intent on the' part of the grantor had
existed which would make the recording a delivery, yet the
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presumption of acceptance by the grantee because of the manifestly
beneficial nature of the deed would not obtain where as here the
facts are known and show that the rights of a third person inter-
vened before the actual acceptance. That the title did not vest by
reason of the recording and the subsequent assent of the grantee
because, although where a deed is delivered to a stranger for a third
person the acceptance will relate back to the timrae of tre first
delivery, yet this is a legal fiction, no title passing until acceptance;
so that where the interests of third parties attach to the property,
they are superior to the title of a subsequently assenting grantee.
Although there is some authority, notably the cases of Merrills v.
Swift, 18 Conn. 257 (1847), and Thompkins v. Wheelen, 16 Peters
(U. S.), 119 (1842), which holds to the contrary, the decision in
this case is in accord with the great weight of authority and
represents well the peculiarity and the justice of the law in such
instance, for which it is held that acceptance of a beneficial deed by
the grantee will be presumed until his dissent is shown-Lessee of
Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377 (1854); Hedge v. Drew, 12 Pick.
141 (1831); Read v. Robinson, 6 W. & S. 329 (1843); and that
acceptance by a grantee relates back to the time of a prior delivery-
by the grantor to a recorder or third person-Hedge v. Drew, 12
Pick. 141 (1831); Bell v. Farmers' Bank, 11 Bush (Ky.), 34, 39
(1874); Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434 (1872) ; from which last
it should follow logically that the grantee would take free from an
intervening attachment-yet the authorities hold that the grantee
does take subject to a lien intervening before his assent, the
presumption of acceptance by the grantee giving way to proof of
the actual facts and the legal fiction of relation being disregarded
to establish justice as between the parties.
A clear statement of the law on this point is contained in the
following excerpt from the opinion of Mr. Justice Lindsay in Bell
v. The Farmers' Bank, supra:
" A deed delivered to the registering officer or to an unauthorized
third person, and subsequently accepted by the grantee, will take
effect as between the grantor and grantee from the time of the first
delivery; and in such cases volunteers claimin under and through
the grantor, and ordinary creditors who have acquired no lien upon
nor interes, in the estate conveyed are entitled to no greater con-
sideration than the grantor. Yet until the grantee is informed of
the execution of the deed and does some act equivalent to an
acceptance of it, it is manifest that he may refuse to accept it, not-
withstanding the ae presumption of an
actual acceptance had all the while existed for his benefit as against
the grantor, his liens, devisees and ordinary creditors. But thisfiction will not be allow d to prevail t the p judice of persons
who have acquired title to an interest in or a lien upon the propertyhef re the date of th  actual acc pta ce. As in the case of an
escrow, whenever it becomes necessary for the purposes of justice
that the true time of the acceptance of a deed so delivered shall he
ascertained, the legal fiction will be disregarded and the intervening
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claimant or lien holder allowed to show the actual facts of the
transaction." This principle is further established and supported by
the following leading cases and authorities: Welch v. Suckett, 12
Wis. 243 (1860) ; Hibherd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547 (1885); Oravens
v. Rossiter, 116 Mo. 338 (1893); Samson v. Thornton, 3 Metc. 275
(1841); Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560 (1870); Rubets v. Scovil,
4 Gelm. 159 (1848); Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Wall, 81 (1866);
Tuttle v. Turner, 28 Tex. 759 (1866); Devl. Deeds, §§ 276, 291;
Am. & Eng. Bite. Law, Vol. 9, p. 161.
0. T. B.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-LIENATION OF HUSBAND'S AFFEC-
TIONS-WIFE's RIGHT OF AcTIoN.-Betzer v. Betzer, 58 N. E.
Rep. 249 (Sup. Court Ill.), 1900.-Elizabeth Betzer and William L.
Betzer were married in Illinois on the twenty-sixth day of Novem-
ber, 1898, and lived together there until December 28, 1899, when
they separated. In 1899 the wife brought this action against
Shepherd B. Betzer, her husband's brother, for alienating her
husband's affections by reason of which he deserted and abandoned
her. Trial by jury was had and the verdict was for the plaintiff,
assessing her damages at $3,700. On appeal the only question
raised was whether a wife in Illinois has a right of action against a
third party for alienating the affections of her husband. It was
incidentally claimed that the plaintiff was barred of her right of
action by a contract entered with her husband after separation,
even if she were otherwise entitled to it. This the court set aside at
once by declaring that "that contract in no sense waived any right
of action against the defendant for the loss here sued for."
It was held that the wife had a right to sue for damages for the
alienation of her husband's affections, and that the statute providing
that a wife may sue and be sued without joining her husband to the
same extent as if sole, obviated all common law bar to such suit.
The court said: "The authorities uniformly hold that a husband
has a right of action at common law for alienating the affections ot
his wife or enticing her away from him; but the weight of authority,
at least in a number of cases decided, holds that the wife cannot
maintain a similar action for the loss of the affection or society of
her husband. This discrimination against the wife has its origin in
the ancient common law doctrine that the husband and wife are one;
that one being the husband, and the wife's rights merged in him.
That idea has, however, been exploded by the enlightenment of the
present age and legislation. One of the difficulties which some of
the courts find in giving the wife the right to sue in such a case is
that she could only bring the action by joining her husband with her
as a party plaintiff. It will be unnecessary to inquire as to the
soundness of that doctrine; it being, as we think, now clearly
settled, if not universally held, that where a statute has removed the
disability of the wife to sue, vesting in her separate rights of
property, she may on the same grounds and with the same right as
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her husband recover for the loss of the affections of her husband,
against one who has wrongfully deprived her of them."
In "Bigelow on Torts," page 153, this language is used: "To
entice or corrupt the mind and affectisns of one's consort is a civil
wrong for which the offender is liable to the injured husband or
wife. The gist of the action is not the loss of assistance, but the loss
of consortium of the husband or wife, uder whch term aincluded the person's affections, society and ai ."
In Schouler's "Husband and Wife," page 171, and Cooley's
"Torts" the doctrine is announced that, "except for the fact of
coverture, there is no reason why such an action could not be main-
tained by the wife."In an extended note to Mlaw v. Chal'm n, 28 S.W. Rep. 328,1894,
it is said : "It has therefore been held by state courts, other thanthose of Maine and Wisconsin, that a wife may, without joining her
husband, maintain an action to recover damages for the alienationof his affections, and the consequent loss of his society, assistance
and support, if under the statutes of the state she is given power tosue for personal wrongs without joining her husband." The ques-
tion raised in this case is interesting as a study o the historical
development of our law. The tendency of the age as well as of thelaw is to place a woman upon the same plane as a man. At common
law a woman was not permitted to sue in her own name because thelaw regarded the husband and wife as one and the rights of that
one as vested in the husband. The wife could neither sue nor be
sued unless the husband was joined with her, and this still being
hsriman faie the rule, the causes which enable her to sue must be
alleged and proved. The authorities, however, are not unanimous
upon this question, some of the cases holding that, "as the wife bad
no property in any damages recovered on her account, for any cause,
neither could she have any cause of action to recover them."
Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich . 123 1891. In other jurisdictions, on the
contrary, it has been held that the wife has, at common law, a prop-
erty right in the damages recovered ; but, owing to the disability of
coverture the husband must be joined with her in the action:
Merhoif v. .Aerhoff, 26 Fed. Rep. 13, 1886.
That the mere fact of marriage, at common law, was not an
absolute extinguishment of all rights of action in the wife seems tobe clearly demonstrated from the fact that a wife could sue in her
own name in the following cases: (1) When her husband was
upesunably dead ; (2) when he was civilly dead; (3) when he was
an alien residing abroad; (4) when he had permanently abandoned
her and the state, and (5) when he bad been divorced from her
"a rnulo marimoni" or " a Mensa 3 1 I othoro.o
A wife, therefore, at common law, had in certain cases a right to
sue in her own name. Whether she had such right in case a third
person alienated her husband's affections was the point raised in the
case under discussion. Mr. Justice Blackstone gives a reason for
denying the wife's right of action in eases of this kind: "The
inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care; or assistance
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of the superior as the superior is held to have in those of the
inferior, and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury."
(3 Blackstone's Comm. 142.) This question is, as I have said,
merely of historical interest, as at the present day most states have
passed statutes specially regulating the rights of married women. I
may add, however, that Mr. Justice Blackstone's view of the ques-
tion has been abandoned by most courts, and a husband and wife
are now regarded as equal under the law, at least with respect to the
conjugal affections and society which each owes to the other. The
husband owes to the wife all that the wife owes him. She has the
same right to the consortium of her husband that he has to hers.
Her right is the same in kind, degree, and value and an injury
thereto is a violation of her person. She is as much entitled under
the law and by moral right to the society, protection, and support
of her husband as he is to her society and services in the household:
-Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. of L. Cases, 577, 1861; Bennett v. Bennett,
116 N. Y. 548.
Many statutes expressly provide that married women may sue
alone, generally or in special cases; and usually the construction of
such statutes involves no particular difficulty. The authority to sue
alone in one class of cases does not, however affect the procedure in
other cases ; the statutes in this respect must be strictly construed.
With regard to the implied powers under a statute, we experience
more difficulty. When a married woman is absolutely entitled to
the damages, she may, as a general rule, sue alone. In some
jurisdictions the substantive right of a married woman to maintain
an action at common law for the alienation of her husband's affec-
tionshas been denied: Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me. 190, 1898; Houston
v. Rice, 54 N. E. Rep. (Mass., 1899) 843; Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis.
374, 1890. Therefore in those jurisdictions the statute would have to
expressly confer the right of action on the wronged wife.
On the other hand, it has been broadly ruled that a married
woman, independently of any statute, has a right of action for the
alienation and loss of her husband's conjugal affections and society,
and may sue, therefore, in her own name, without joining her husband
as co-plaintiff: Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 4, 1889.
Still other authorities hold that a married woman has a cause of
action against a party who wrongfully alienates the affections of her
husband, but, by reason of the disability of coverture, the right
remains in abeyance and cannot be prosecuted by the feme covert
in her own name. Hayes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 584, 1891 ; Smith v.
Smith, 98 Tenn. 101, 1896.
Of course the wife cannot sue by joining with her husband, since
this would allow him to join in an action for an injury which he has
caused, though he acted under the influence of another: Bassett v.
Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 544, 1886. But, if the husband dies, or there is
an absolute divorce, the right of action has been held to remain in the
property of the wife and may be prosecuted by her as a feme sole,
and the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until the
removal of the disability: Postlewaite v. Postlewaite, 1 Ind. App.,
1891, 473.
The general tendency of the statutes in all jurisdictions and of
the decisions under them has been to grant equal rights to both
husband and wifb, irrespective of any substantive right existing at
common law, and to enable a wife, who has been wronged, to suethe
wrongdoer even though he be her husband: ifuling v. Huling, 32
111. 522; Price v. Price, 91 Iowa, 693, 1894; Warren v. Warren, 89
Mich. 123 ; Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn. 476 1897 ; Leaver v.
Leaver, 66 N. Y. 142; Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 1878.
In Pennsylvania the doctrine that a wife may sue for alienating
the affections of her husband is pretty well settled; since, under our
Married Womens' Acts, she is considered as a feme sole for nearly
all purposes. In Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Penn. 233 (1898), Fell,
J., said : "The right of a wife to maintain an action for the same
cause (alienation of affections) has been denied because of the
common law unity of the husband and wife and of her want of
property in his society and assistance. There was certainly an
inconsistency in a recovery when her husband was a necessary party
to the action, and she had no separate legal existence or interest and
the damages would belong to him, but the gist of the action is the
same in either case. There is no substantial difference in the right
which each has to the society, companionship and aid of the other;
and the injury is the same whether it affects the husband or the wife.
Where the wife has been freed from her common law liabilities and
may sue in her own name and right for torts done her, we see no
reason to doubt her right to maintain an action against one who has
wrongfully induced her husband to leave her."
The general effect of the authorities, therefore, seems to be that
the wife had, at common law, a right of action for alienating her
husband's affections; but the right was in abeyance until the
disability was removed by divorce, death, statute, or some other
means.
M. H.
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